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Charitable Trusts for Religious Purposes: Earthly Tests and Ethereal Matters 
  
In order for a trust to be recognised as charitable in law, it must meet the following criteria 
(Andrew Butler (ed) Equity and Trusts in New Zealand (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, 2009) at 
273): 
 
i) Under law be deemed charitable; 
ii) Satisfy the public benefit test; 
iii) Be beneficial, not detrimental; 
iv) Be for charitable purposes. 
 
It is on the issue of the public benefit test that this paper focuses, specifically in relation to 
those trusts that fall into the category of the advancement of religion.  Before turning to the 
issues associated with such matters, it is worthwhile considering briefly the jurisprudential 
evolution of the charitable purpose requirement to contextualise the contemporary position of 
trusts that fall into the class of the advancement of religion. 
 
The origin of “charitable” is to be found in the preamble to the Elizabethan Statute of 
Charitable Uses 1601, which contained a list of purposes legally recognised as charitable, 
including: relief of poor; maintenance of schools; marriage of poor maids; repair of churches; 
and support and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed.  This list was 
not exhaustive however as “those purposes are charitable which that statute enumerates or 
which by analogies are deemed within its spirit and intendment.” (Morice v Bishop of 
Durham (1805) 9 Ves 399 at 405 per Sir William Grant MR)  The concept therefore of the 
advancement of religion began its life in this preamble, (E H Burn and G J Virgo Maudsley & 
Burn’s Trusts and Trustees Cases & Materials (7th ed, Oxford University Press, 2008)  at 
464) but the principle of the advancement of religion began its evolution when Lord 
Macnaghten, in the case of Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v Pemsel 
Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531, considered 
the list of charitable purposes as set out in the preamble and summarised the purposes into 
four categories: 
 
a) Trusts for the relief of poverty;  
b) Trusts for the advancement of education; 
c) Trusts for the advancement of religion; 
d) Trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the 
preceding heads. 
 
 Lord Macnaghten’s categorisation then formed the framework for statutory recognition of 
charitable purpose, as recognised in section 5(1) Charities Act 2005 in New Zealand and in 
England and Wales, the Charities Act 2006.   
 
Religion is construed widely by the courts and religion and has been defined in law as 
(Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120 at 
136): 
 
...the criteria of religion are twofold: first, belief in a supernatural Being, Thing or Principle; 
and second, the acceptance of canons of conduct in order to give effect to that belief, though 
canons of conduct which offend against ordinary laws are outside the area of any immunity, 
privilege or right conferred on the grounds of religion.  Those criteria may vary in their 
comparative importance, and there may be a different intensity of belief or of acceptance of 
canons of conduct among religions or among the adherents to a religion.  The tenets of 
religion may give primacy to one particular belief or to one particular canon of conduct.  
Variations in emphasis may distinguish one religion from other religions, but they are 
irrelevant to the determination of an individual’s or a group’s freedom to prove and exercise 
the religion of his, or their, choice. 
 
This definition was approved by Thompkins J in Centrepoint Community Growth Trust v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1985] 1 NZLR 673 at 693, who referred to the 
“particularly helpful judgment of the High Court of Australia” when accepting the tests “so 
persuasively set out” (Centrepoint Community Growth Trust v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue  at 695) in that judgment in the Church of New Faith case in order to determine that 
the trust in the Centrepoint Community case “has as one of its principal purposes the 
advancement of religion.” (Centrepoint Community Growth Trust v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue  at 698)  As a result of this wide construction of the concept of religious purpose, 
courts will not distinguish between religions, (Neville v Madden [1962] 1 Ch 832 at 853) and 
the “question of whether or not something is a religion turns on its beliefs, practices and 
observances, not on the verity or meaning of its writings.” (G E Dal Pont and D R C 
Chalmers, Equity and Trusts in Australia (4th ed, Sydney: Thomson Lawbook Co, 2007) at 
757)   
 
If gifts for the purposes of religion are to be found as charitable trusts, at their core they must 
advance religion, which means “the promotion of spiritual teaching in a broad sense, and 
involves spreading the religious message through taking positive steps such as pastoral 
activities.” (Juliet Chevalier-Watts “Under the Law of Charity, is the Principle of ‘Public 
Benefit’ Being Hindered by the Doctrinal Rule of Precedent?” (2008) 16 Waikato Law 
Review at 200)  The first case to offer a concise interpretation of the notion of advancement 
of religion was Keren Kayemeth le Jisroel Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1931] 2 KB 
465, CA, at 477 where Lord Hanworth MR commented that: 
 
The promotion of religion means the promotion of spiritual teaching in a wide sense, and the 
maintenance of the doctrines on which it rests, and the observances that serve to promote and 
manifest it. 
 
Such a view finds support in Donavan J’s judgment in United Grand Lodge of Ancient Free 
and Accepted Masons of England v Holburn Borough Council [1957] 3 All ER 28 at 1090 
where it was noted that: 
 
[t]o advance religion means to promote it, to spread its message ever wider among mankind; 
to take some positive steps to sustain and increase religious belief; and these things are done 
in a variety of ways which may be comprehensively described as pastoral and missionary. 
 
As a result, Donavan J (at 1090) could find no evidence to support the argument that 
freemasonry reflected these elements because there is nothing in the freemasonry 
constitution, nor in the evidence tendered to the Court, that freemasonry promotes any form 
of religious instruction, nor follows a religious programme to persuade non-believers, nor 
requires religious supervision to ensure that its followers remain religiously active and 
provides no form of pastoral activity or missionary work.  As a result, the Court (at 1090) 
was of “the view that [Freemasonry’s] main object is clearly not the advancement of 
religion.” 
 
Gifts for the advancement of religion will be valid if the element of public benefit is present, 
however, if “the purposes are found to be of a religious nature, the court will generally 
assume a public a benefit unless the contrary is shown.” ( Dal Pont et al at 761)  It is this 
assumption of public benefit that has raised concerns as to the manner in which courts 
address this purported presumption and how the courts address the situations where the 
presumption is rebutted.  This paper now considers the veracity of the presumption of the 
public benefit. 
 
The Presumption of Public Benefit Requirement 
 
Harding opines that the presumption of public benefit has existed implicitly in trusts for 
religious purposes for centuries although there appears to be little historical reason for such 
an association to exist. (Matthew Harding “Trusts for Religious Purposes and the Question of 
Public Benefit” (2008) The Modern Law Review 71 March 2 at 161)  However, the author 
respectfully submits that perhaps the association was not so much with religion and public 
benefit, rather it was the courts recognising the natural association between religion and 
charity.  Indeed, regardless of the lack of any mention of religion specifically in the preamble 
of the Statute of Charitable Uses, from the outset the courts have associated religion as a 
charitable purpose. (Miguel Rodriguez Blanco “Religion and the Law of Charities” (2005) 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal (8) 38 at 5)  The case of Pember v Kington Inhabitants (1639) 
Toth 34 reflects this sentiment clearly, where despite religion not being mentioned in the 
Statute, the Court understood that religion and charitable status were within the equity of the 
Act.  This approach is supported by the findings of the seventeenth century case of Attorney-
General v Baxter (1684) 1 Vern 248.  In this case, Sir Francis North struck down a trust for 
the maintenance of non-conformist clergymen as being for superstitious use, although it was 
noted that the trust had charitable intent and that a trust for religious purposes is a trust for 
charitable purposes.  There was no consideration as to whether the public would benefit from 
such a charitable trust thus suggesting that whilst religion and charity were natural 
bedfellows, religion and the notion of public benefit were not yet contemplated.   
 
Evidence does suggest that the courts have impliedly presumed a presumption of public 
benefit when considering trusts for religious purposes, however, case law also suggests that 
such an assumption was not without boundaries.  The seminal case of Gilmour v Coats 
[1949] AC 426 offers support to such a notion.  In this case, the House of Lords addressed 
“the validity of a trust for a community of cloistered Catholic nuns who devoted their lives 
solely to prayer, contemplation, penance and intercessory prayer.” (Dal Pont et al at 761)  
Their Lordships upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal and found that the purposes of the 
priory were not charitable.  In doing so, their Lordships approved the case of Cocks v 
Manners (1871) LR 12 Esq 574.  In Gilmour, Lord Reid noted (at 461) that English law had 
always favoured gifts for religious purposes, thus embedding the notion that the law 
implicitly recognises religion as a positive action, however, relying on arguments presented 
in the case of Cocks, Lord Reid commented that the public benefit test is limited and if the 
public benefit is too remote, then the trust will fail for not being for the benefit of the public.  
Lord Reid further commented (at 461)that the test laid down in Cocks, which had stood, at 
that time, for three-quarters of a century, ought not to be reversed when the question of 
degree of public benefit is so limited in this case.  In the later case of National Deposit 
Friendly Society Trustees v Skegness Urban District Council [1959] AC 293 at 321-322 Lord 
Denning was clear where religion may or may not be seen to be advanced and thus for the 
public benefit: 
 
The one thing that distinguishes charitable objects from all others is that they are for the good 
of the community, that is, for public rather than for private benefit...[t]he “advancement of 
religion” connotes the promotion of religion by spiritual teaching or by pastoral or missionary 
work among others outside one’s circle.  When a man says his prayers in the privacy of his 
bedroom, he may truly be said to be considered with religion but not with the advancement of 
religion. 
 
Thus it is clear that although there may be a presumption that trusts for religious purposes do 
fulfil the public benefit requirement, courts are still willing to test that presumption.  
However, the issue then for the courts is what actually constitutes a public benefit, and on 
that basis, the courts are in the unenviable position of having to determine what constitutes 
sufficient evidence of public benefit.  It is to this issue that the paper now turns. 
 
Evaluating Public Benefit 
 
In cases where there are obvious tangible benefits to the public, then there should be little 
difficulty in finding public benefit but the actual requirement of benefit for a community is 
problematic because this requirement refers to a legal concept that has no clear definition.  
Certainly there is no statutory definition and “its determination corresponds to the courts on 
the basis of the circumstances of the particular case in point.” (Miguel Rodriguez Blanco at 
13)  Since this requirement is so imprecise, it is perhaps easier to outline circumstances where 
trusts for religious purposes would not be beneficial to the public.  If a religion encourages 
followers to use violence against the public, or against non-followers, then this clearly would 
be contrary to the notion of public benefit.  However, care must be taken with such a 
principle because charitable status does not necessarily depend on public favour or opinion, 
thus a religion may not have public favour, but it may still fall within the concept of being 
beneficial publically.  Indeed, the Charity Commission for England and Wales noted that the 
existence of harm or detriment does not automatically render an organisation uncharitable as 
it is a question of balancing the benefits against the possible harm or detriment. (The Charity 
Commission “Charities and Public Benefit, The Charity Commission’s General Guidance on 
Public Benefit” (2008) [E4] 
<www.charitycommission.gov.uk/Library/publicbenefit/pdfs/publicbenefittext.pdf> ) 
  
Therefore if the harm or detriment outweighs the benefit, then the purpose would fail as a 
charity.  Mere disagreement would not be adequate evidence as to whether a purpose is 
beneficial or not, and where benefits are overwhelming, then inconsequential detriment 
would not affect the requirement to fulfil public benefit. (The Charity Commission)  
 
Common law appears clear that public benefit cannot be demonstrated where the benefits are 
essentially private and thus without evidence of tangible benefits. (F Cranmer “Religion and 
Public Benefit” (2009) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 11(2) at 2)  This has been the position 
since the case of Cocks v Manners, which was approved without hesitation in Gilmour v 
Coats.  Nonetheless, such an approach has not been without issue. 
 
In the case of Gilmour, it was the lack of evidence of spiritual benefit that was the key issue 
in this “high water mark of the judicial refusal to uphold trusts for religious purposes in the 
absence of tangible benefit”. (Harding at 172)  The case arose as a result of an attempt to 
create a trust for the purposes of a nunnery in London.  The religious order had two purposes: 
the contemplation of divine things and intercession for the souls of others.  The order was 
also a closed order.  The Court was asked to make two findings of fact: (Harding at 172) 
 
First, that the nuns’ intercessory prayers caused the grace of God to be bestowed on those for 
whom the nuns prayed; and secondly, that the nuns’ pious lives were a source of edification to 
others.  It was hoped that…the purposes of the Carmelite nunnery were for the public benefit 
and therefore charitable. 
 
 It is questionable how a court may make findings of facts on the ethereal subject of the effect 
of prayer.  Indeed, Lord Simonds (at 446) expressed such a concern:  
 
…whether I affirm or deny, whether I believe or disbelieve, what has that do with the 
proof which the court demands that a particular purpose satisfies the test of benefit to 
the community?  Here is something which is manifestly not susceptible of proof. 
 
Regardless of the lack of susceptible proof, the burden is however on the court to make such 
a finding.   Prima facie such an undertaking may appear futile, however, the Court in the 
instant case had already noted that “[n]owhere has the court laid down that the benefit to the 
public of religious charities must be of any particular kind or must proved in anyway”, 
(Gilmour v Coats at 437) thus the Court has already given itself free rein to determine the 
public benefit as appropriate.   
 
Lord Simonds was careful to separate the values of a church and the requirements of the 
court.  His Lordship (at 446) noted that the religiously minded embrace a faith that is 
intangible, and although the advancement of religion is a head of charity, it does not follow 
that a court must accept as proved that which a church would believe. As a result, his 
Lordship (at 446) was able to entrench the notion that a court is not bound by intangible 
concepts and therefore “the court can only act on proof.”  Unfortunately, his Lordship failed 
to clarify exactly what that proof may entail, although he added (at 446) that the alleged 
elements of public benefit to be found in edification is too vague and intangible to satisfy the 
prescribed test. It is unfortunate that his Lordship was able to express so coherently the 
requirement that the court must be presented with tangible proof that the advancement of 
religion benefits the public in some fashion, but yet failed to address the very key issue as to 
what would actually satisfy that prescribed test.  The later case of re Warre’s Wills Trusts 
[1953] 1 WLR 725 also considered this very issue, but it is opined that although the instant 
case entrenched the concept of public benefit and the advancement of religion, it added little 
to the substantive issue of how one should satisfy that test.  
 
In this case, a testatrix gave the residue of her estate to the Salisbury Diocesan Board of 
Finance to, inter alia, provide and maintain a retreat house. This retreat house was devoted to 
a form of religious exercise whereby individuals may enter the retreat house for a period of 
time for religious contemplation and cleansing of the soul.  The Court was invited to 
determine whether, inter alia, such a scheme constituted a valid charitable trust.    Harman J, 
referring to Gilmour v Coats, noted that such an activity was undoubtedly beneficial for those 
who wished to undertake such pursuits, but that would not necessarily be recognised under 
law as being charitable.  Harman J reiterated (at 728-729) the House of Lords’ requirement in 
Gilmour that the test of public benefit must do more than edify an individual or a small group 
of individuals, and thus any religious activity which does not affect the public, or any section 
of it is not charitable. As a result, the purpose of the trust in the instant case was not 
charitable.  However, the author respectfully submits that Harman J actually did little to 
clarify what constitutes a public benefit.  It is noted clearly (at 729) that “activities which do 
not in any affect the public or any section of it are not charitable”, yet at no stage did the 
Court answer whether the retreat house was available to members of the public, and if so, 
how many.  Therefore it remained unclear as to what constituted a section of the public, and 
in what circumstances the public benefit test could be satisfied.    
 
An answer to this question of uncertainty may be found in the judgment provided by Cross J 
in the case of Neville Estates Ltd v Madden and Others [1962] 1 Ch 832.  In this case, Cross J 
expressed his concern about the burden placed on courts to determine whether a religious 
purpose confers a public benefit.  He noted (at 852) that even assuming that such a question 
can be answered, judges are “generally ill equipped to answer them and their endeavours to 
do so apt to cause distress to the faithful and amusement to the cynical.”  This sentiment no 
doubt has its origins in the judgment of Lord Simonds in the case of Gilmour, to which this 
paper referred earlier.  In that case, his Lordship separated the differing values of churches 
and the requirements of the courts, and in doing so, created a chasm between the two 
institutes without providing an adequate method of reconciling the differences.  Cross J (at 
852) in Neville Estate appeared to recognise this chasm between the two bodies but 
reluctantly admitted that “the decision of Gilmour v Coats has made it clear that a trust for a 
religious purpose must be shown to have some element of public benefit in order to qualify as 
a charitable trust.”  His Honour then endeavoured to quantify how the test of public benefit 
may be satisfied. His Honour noted that similarities may be drawn between Gilmour and the 
present case, in that in the case of Neville, those of the Jewish faith living in a specific area 
may constitute a section of the public, but they are no more a section of the public than the 
members of the Carmelite order in the case of Gilmour.  However, his Honour opined that 
that is where the similarities may end, as the members of the Synagogue in the present case 
are not separated from the rest of the world, which distinguished it from the members of the 
Carmelite order, whose members are required to live in seclusion from the rest of the world.  
Therefore his Honour concluded that the Carmelite order can confer no public benefit 
because the order is not permitted to live among or socialise with the rest of the world and 
thus cannot have any discernible affect on the outside world.   Once his Honour had 
distinguished the two situations, he was then able to provide some clarity as to that which 
may constitute a public benefit.  It was presumed that some benefit is disseminated to the 
public from the attendance of a place of worship by those who live in this world and mix with 
the public. (Neville Estates Ltd v Madden and Others at 852-853)  Certainly this goes 
someway to providing some benchmark as to how the test may be satisfied, however, it is still 
unclear how such a benefit accrues to the public by worshippers at a specific place of 
worship.  Cross J did not address this issue but did note (at 854) that the “law of charity has 
been built up not logically by empirically, and there is a political background peculiar to 
religious trusts which may well have influenced the developed of the law.”  Such discourse 
reflects the discomfort of the courts in having to address such matters and perhaps goes some 
way to explain the vague jurisprudence of the law relating to public benefit and religious 
advancement. 
 
The case of re Banfield, Decd. Lloyds Bank Ltd v Smith and Others [1968] 1 WLR 846 
however does provide some link to bridge the chasm between worship and the requirement of 
public benefit.  Goff J confirmed (at 850) that in the case of Gilmour, the cloistered nuns 
were an introspective community thus the benefit to the public was too “intangible to be 
recognised and evaluated by a court of law.”  In the instant case however the testatrix gifted 
some of her estate to the Pilsdon Community House, which was a religious community 
whose members carried out prayer and work in the community.  The House also received 
members of the public who needed help and support.  Goff J noted that this clearly showed 
that the work was for the public benefit, but he added the caveat that that alone was not 
sufficient, and the work must be shown to be in the spirit and intendment of the Statute of 
Elizabeth.  In his Honour’s opinion, (at 851-852) that test is satisfied by considering the 
work, not in isolation, but by looking at the work of the trust as a whole and therefore in that 
situation, it fell fully within the principle.  Thus Goff J has provided some measure of how 
the advancement of religion may satisfy the public benefit test, albeit in a very broad fashion. 
 
However, applying such measures is a double-edged sword.  On the one hand, the courts are 
providing some measure of clarity to a problematic area of law.  On the other hand, it is 
difficult to reconcile how earthly tests can possibly measure the benefits of ethereal beliefs.  
Such a sentiment finds support in the judgment of Hutley JA in the Australian case Joyce v 
Ashfield Municipal Council [1975] 1 NSWLR 744.  In this case, his Honour opined concern 
(at 259) about subjecting religious activities to scrutiny by the courts of the public benefit of 
such activities, noting that such scrutiny “could give rise to great problems in that it might 
lead to the scrutiny by the courts of the public benefit of all religious practices”, which is 
inconsistent with the judicial notion that religious matters are incapable of objective proof. (G 
E Dal Pont and D R C Chalmers Equity and Trusts in Australia (4th ed Sydney: Lawbook Co) 
at 761)  Nonetheless, the case of Gilmour v Coats established clearly that whilst belief or 
faith “is manifestly not susceptible of proof...the court can act only on proof”.  (Gilmour v 
Coats at 446)  Therefore earthly tests must be applied to establish the public benefit of 
ethereal matters.  Hutley JA’s concerns certainly have validity however his Honour has 
perhaps gone someway to limiting the applicability of the test in Gilmour v Coats by noting 
that that case “must be confined to those religious bodies who take no part in the secular 
world.” (Joyce v Ashfield Municipal Council at 261)  His Honour affirmed this notion by 
referring to Lord Reid’s dissenting judgment in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Baddeley 
[1955] AC 572 at 612 where his Lordship commented that: 
 
...if members of a religious denomination do not constitute a section of the public (or the 
community) then a trust solely for the advancement of religion...would not be a charitable 
trust if limited to members of a particular church. 
 
Hutley JA acknowledged (at 261) that although this is a dissenting judgment, “it is obviously 
correct on this issue” therefore confirming that those religious orders whose activities are 
confined to non-secular dissemination cannot be construed as satisfying the public benefit 
test.  In such circumstances the law then is clear.  However, in cases where facts are not quite 
so unambiguous, then there is little guidance on how to deal with questions of public benefit 
except perhaps to apply the broad test as outlined by Goff J in the case of Banfield, as 
discussed earlier in the paper.   
 
This broad test has been echoed recently by the England and Wales Charity Commission in 
its 2008 draft supplemental guidance on public benefit and the advancement of religion. 
(Charity Commission, England and Wales “Analysis of the Law Underpinning the 
Advancement of Religion for the Public Benefit” December 2008 <www.charity-
commission.gov.uk/Library/publicbenefit/pdfs/lawrel1208.pdf>)  The draft guidance 
confirms that the Charity Commission will adopt a flexible approach with regard to charities 
that advance religion. (Charity Commission “Analysis of the Law Underpinning the 
Advancement of Religion for the Public Benefit” [2.1]-[2.3])   
 
The guidance suggests that the public benefit requirement will be satisfied “if the beliefs and 
practices, reflected in the religion’s doctrines and codes, tend towards a moral or spiritual 
welfare or improvement of society and the benefits extend to the public or a sufficient section 
of the public.” (Helen Palmer “Trustees’ Responsibilities and Public Benefit (2008) 6 Private 
Client Business at 420)  The guidance (at [3.7]) is clear however that moral and spiritual 
improving of religious purpose on the public must be capable of being demonstrated, thus 
echoing the requirements of Gilmour, but the guidance (at [3.8]) explicitly provides examples 
of how this can be measured, for instance by the consequential effect that the beliefs and 
practices being promoted by the teachings has on its followers or others such as promoting 
trust, community engagement or civil engagement. The guidance (at [3.12]) is also clear that 
the benefits must be related to the aims of the organisation so this can be determined by 
ensuring that the “core tenets and practices of the religion are beneficial and essentially 
public.”  The guidance therefore reflects the requirements established by case law, but 
provides some certainty as to how the benefits may extend to the public, or at least a 




The jurisprudence of the public benefit element of the advancement of religion has been 
problematic because the courts have been required to impose worldly tests on matters of 
spirituality, which will inherently be fraught with difficulties.  Australia “at least has 
addressed this particular issue” (Chevalier-Watts at 201) where section 5(1)(b) of the 
Extension of Charitable Purposes Act 2004 (Cth) states that an institution has a purpose for 
the public benefit to the extent that it is either: 
 
...a closed or contemplative religious order that regularly undertakes prayerful 
intervention  at the request of members of the public...or an open and non-
discriminatory self-help group. 
 
New Zealand has yet to be provided with such clarity although the information offered by the 
Charity Commission of England and Wales may provide useful guidance should future cases 
fall outside of the limited clarity that case law has provided to date. 
 
